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This is anOpeAbstract – The CONFIDENCE dissemination workshop “Coping with uncertainties for improved
modelling and decision making in nuclear emergencies” was held in December 2–5, 2019 (Bratislava,
Slovak Republic). About 90 scientists and decision makers attended the workshop. The dissemination
workshop allowed the presentation of the CONFIDENCE project results, demonstration of the applicability
of the developed methods and tools in interactive discussion sessions and the collection of feedback from the
participants. The results were disseminated not only in the form of presentations and posters but also through
interactive workshops where all participants were involved in round table working groups. A fictive
accidental release scenario taking place at a nuclear power plant was developed and used by each work
package in the workshop to provide the basis for interactive sessions and discussions.
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CONFIDENCE1 Introduction
The CONFIDENCE Project, funded under the H2020 EJP
CONCERT (European Joined Project), performed research
focused on uncertainties in the area of emergency management
and long-term rehabilitation. It concentrated on the early and
transition phases of an emergency, but also considered longer-
term decisions made during these phases. The project brought
together expertise from four European Radiation Protection
Research Platforms (NERIS, MELODI, ALLIANCE and
EURADOS) and also from SHARE (Social Sciences andding author: tatiana.duranova@vuje.sk
nAccess article distributed under the terms of the Creative CommonsA
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any mHumanities network). The CONFIDENCE Final Dissemination
workshop “Coping with uncertainties for improved modelling
and decision making in nuclear emergencies” was held in
December 2019 (Bratislava, Slovak Republic). About 90 sci-
entists and decision makers attended the workshop.
The objectives of this final workshop were as follows:t
e–trib
diuto disseminate the knowledge acquired and to demonstrate
the capability of the developed models, methods,
approaches, guidance, recommendations and tools;– to collect feedback from end users on outputs and
remaining research requirements, or improvements, in
models or guides; this feedback may be used by the
Radiation Protection Research Platforms to further develop
their Strategic Research Agendas and Joint roadmap.utionLicense (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits
m, provided the original work is properly cited.
Fig. 2. Source term of the hypothetical scenario and its position on the
INES scale (International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale)
compared to the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents.
S18 T. Duranova et al.: Radioprotection 2020, 55(HS1), S17–S37The workshop was designed to be of value to the different
actors in emergency and recovery preparedness and manage-
ment: decision makers, advisors, researchers and stakeholders
(professional and students including early career researchers)
at various levels (international, national, regional, local) that
may play a role within the decision making process during the
post-release and transition phases of a nuclear/radiological
accident.
The complexity of the areas of research as well as a variety
of tools and methods developed under the CONFIDENCE
project provided an opportunity to perform the dissemination
of the results in an interactive way. The workshop comprised
presentations, panels, poster sessions and scenario-based
facilitated group discussions. Each work package (WP) of
the CONFIDENCE project dealt with different stages of the
decision making process. The WP used various tools and
methods, including simulation, measurements, surveys and
panels. The workshop program alternated between WP
presentations and interactive discussions using the same
scenario as a common thread (described in Sect. 2), but
oriented toward issues and outputs specific to each WP
(presented in Sect. 3). The programme followed the stages of a
decision making process in case of an accidental release of
radioactive material.
2 Using a scenario as a key method of
communication CONFIDENCE outputs
To facilitate the workshop a scenario-based on a (fictitious)
large nuclear accident at the Borssele power plant in the
Netherlands (Fig. 1) was developed; extensive territories in this
country and in the neighbouring Belgium were affected by the
resultant plume. It was based on the hypothetical accident
scenario used byWP1 for uncertainty propagation, the so-called
Fig. 1. Location of the hypothetical scenario.Radiological Ensemble Modelling (REM) case study, with the
short release scenario (Korsakissok et al., 2020).
All presentations and the facilitated discussions and group
work used the scenario as a common thread, demonstrating
CONFIDENCEs outputs and prompting discussion.
2.1 Release scenario
The source termoriginally designed andusedbyWP1for the
REM case study was scaled to a 900MWe reactor (instead of
485MWe at Borssele). For the purpose of demonstration, the
source term was artificially multiplied by a further factor of 5 in
order to have large consequences, for instance in terms of
populationor surfaceaboveagivendose threshold.This increase
led to an accidental release of 800 PBq I-131 equivalent,
comparable to the Fukushima release (Fig. 2).The radionuclides
Fig. 3. Wind speed and direction at the source location, forecast by the ensemble members at 10m (black) and 250m (gray) above ground. The
x-axis shows the number of hours after beginning of meteorological forecast, “Now” is the time when the decision making takes place during the
first stage. The “potential release time” is at 21:00UTC±6 hours (dark rectangle).
T. Duranova et al.: Radioprotection 2020, 55(HS1), S17–S37 S19considered were: 90Sr, 131I, 132I, 132Te, 133Xe, 137mBa, 134Cs,
136Cs and 137Cs. The release duration was four hours.
Uncertainties on the release time were considered to be ±6
hours.
2.2 Meteorological scenario
The meteorological fields were provided by KNMI using
the high-resolution HARMONIE-AROME model. An ensem-
ble of 10 meteorological members was constructed by KNMI
to represent the meteorological uncertainties (Geertsema et al.,
2019). The meteorological scenario (corresponding to WP1
case study REM-2) featured a meteorological variability in the
wind direction and precipitation within a few hours during the
passage of a warm front (Figs. 3 and 4).
The content of the meteorological fields was “shifted” in
time from January to July in order to have a significant impact
on food products such as milk (with cows grazing outside in
July), cereals or vegetables (Hamburger et al., 2020). This
enabled the consideration of agricultural countermeasures.
2.3 Combination of uncertainties in wind direction,
precipitation and release time
The uncertainty associated with the release time was ±6
hours, and the potential release period covered the time duringwhich the warm front passage occurred, leading to significant
variability in wind speed and direction (Fig. 3).
The wind direction change and precipitation, combined
with the uncertainty in the release time, led to large differences
in the plume trajectory and subsequent footprint (Fig. 4). The
plume travelled northeast when considering a release at
12:00UTC on day D (12/07/2017 in the interactive scenario)
with small to medium amounts of precipitation, whilst it was
advected south–southeast if the release occurred later (at
18:00UTC on day D or 00:00UTC on day Dþ 1), with heavy
precipitation around 18:00UTC. This induced large uncer-
tainties in the health consequences and subsequent counter-
measures to be taken, which were tackled in the WP1 part of
the interactive discussion (Sect. 3.1).
During the workshop, each WP introduced other types of
uncertainties related to their specific research and develop-
ments, in order to demonstrate the outcomes and facilitate
discussions and feedback from the workshop participants.
3 Summary of scenario-based
demonstrations and feedback
The following sections provide information on the way
each CONFIDENCEWP adapted the scenario to their specific
issues, and summarises the resulting discussions and feedback
from the participants.
Fig. 4. Indicative 6-hour plume trajectories based on analysed weather as a function of height (between 10m and 500m), for a release on 12/07/
17 at 12:00, 18:00UTC, and 13/07/17 at 00:00UTC and rain (cumulated in one hour). Trajectories plotted by KNMI.
Fig. 5. Stage 1 of WP1 discussions. Estimated time to release  24
hours. Uncertainty in the release time: ±6 hours.
Fig. 6. Questionsasked to theaudienceduring stage1ofWP1discussions.
S20 T. Duranova et al.: Radioprotection 2020, 55(HS1), S17–S373.1 Model improvement in the pre- and release phase,
through uncertainty analysis and propagation with an
ensemble approach (WP1)
The issues tackled during the interactive discussions led by
WP1 were related to the emergency phase. Specifically, the
audience was asked to play the role of decision makers in an
emergency situation, where decisions have to be made for the
protection of the population before the release occurs. The
discussion was divided in two stages. In the first stage (stage 1),
the audiencewas advised that possible releasewas anticipated to
take place within 24 hours, with an uncertainty of ±6 hours
(Figs. 3 and 5). The second stage (stage 2), 12 hours before the
release, updated the scenario with new information on the
accidental situation: the release timewas now certain (Fig. 9). In
thefirst stage, discussions focused on evacuation and sheltering.
During the second stage, decisions made in the first stage were
reviewed in light of the updated situation.
The goal of this exercise was to consider how uncertainties
intrinsic to an emergency situation could be dealt with during
the decision making process. In particular, several maps were
presented to the audience in order to present as clearly as
possible the different options. One of the feedbacks requested
from the participants concerned the maps and outputs that were
useful for decision making (Fig. 6).
Fig. 7. Prognostic frequency map for areas above the threshold value for evacuation (left) and sheltering (right), considering an uncertainty in the
release time of ±6 hours. The value 0 corresponds to areas where no simulation forecast a threshold exceedance, and 1 (red (black in B&W
printed version)) implies that all simulations considered predict a value above the threshold.
Fig. 8. Mapsofeffectivedose for (a) the“least severe”and (b) the“worst case” scenarios in termsofpopulationaffectedby the thresholdexceedance.
The first item in the legend (red colour) corresponds to evacuation and the second item in legend (orange colour) to sheltering criterion.
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presented to the audience,whichwas then divided into groups of
about 10 people. In stage 1, half of the groups discussed
evacuation and the others, sheltering. In stage 2, all groups were
to review their decisions taken in the first stage and to discuss
foodban.Each roundofdiscussion took15minutes, followedby
15minutes of feedback (each group had to nominate a referee to
report the discussions and decisions reached).3.1.1 WP1 scenario-based discussions: stage 1
3.1.1.1 Presentation of the support for discussion
The discussions within the stage 1 focused on sheltering
and evacuation of the population and were driven by the
questions given in Figure 6.
To inform discussion, several maps were presented to the
audience. For a given dose corresponding to a particular
Fig. 9. Stage 2 of WP1 discussions. Estimated time to release 
12 hours. No uncertainty in the release time.
Fig. 10. Questions for WP1 discussion for stage 2–evacuation and
sheltering.
Fig. 11. Questions for WP1 discussion for the stage 2–food
restriction.
Fig. 12. Comparison of prognostic frequency maps for areas above the threshold value for evacuation: stage 1 with uncertainty in release time
(left) and stage 2 without uncertainty in release time (right).
S22 T. Duranova et al.: Radioprotection 2020, 55(HS1), S17–S37protective action (levels given in Fig. 5), a map of “frequency
of threshold exceedance” was represented. These maps could
be interpreted in terms of likelihood that a given area could be
affected by a dose above the given threshold (Fig. 7).
The frequency maps showed the areas that would “most
probably” be affected by the accidental release, however, they
were not able to provide a view of the plume footprint that may
actually occur. To complement this, example maps of particular
simulations (that is, possible outcomes) were provided. The
focus was on the “least severe” and “worst case” scenarios in
terms of populationwithin the area of threshold exceedance.Out
of the 50 simulations (called ensemble members) representing
different possible situations (and combined into the frequencymaps presented in Fig. 7), the “worst case”was corresponded to
simulation number 41 and the “least severe” to member 29.
Figure 8 shows the maps of effective dose resulting from these
two simulations. The map of the “least severe” case presents a
plume footprint located southeast of the release location, which
corresponds to a release occurring after the wind direction
change. The “worst case” map shows an area of threshold
exceedance in the north-eastern zone. The former is within the
area of higher frequency of threshold exceedance, whilst the
latter corresponds to a lower frequency (Fig. 7). In other words,
there was a smaller chance that the “worst case” scenario occurs
but, if it did, the consequences would be more severe than for
more “probable” scenarios.
Fig. 13. Frequency maps for effective dose>10mSv (top panels) and iodine in milk>500Bq/kg (bottom panels), without (left) and with (right)
data assimilation.
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Evacuation
The main information that participants inferred from the
frequency maps (Fig. 7) was the high uncertainty in the direction
of travel of the plume. Therefore, the decision to evacuate was
assumed to be uniform in all directions (within a given radius) and
participants considered only distance from the release (and not
direction). Some proposed a radius of 5 km if resources permit.
They expressed a need for information on site plan,
location of evacuation shelters, resources, vulnerable people,
planning zones (and actions already decided within this zone)
and tourist numbers.Sheltering
Participants used frequencymaps and population maps, but
had more difficulty reaching a decision. Some proposed to wait
for more information (e.g. on the plume direction) before
issuing a message, others proposed to recommend “preparation
for sheltering”.
They discussed the timing of the message, for instance, to
avoid rush hours and panic. They suggested issuing the
message to shelter when most people were already at home.
Some separated the information given in the maps into
2 different areas: high probability/low consequence, and low
probability/high consequence.
Fig. 14. Updated combination of model results and monitoring data: additional information from mobile dose rate monitoring in indicated area
(gray or orange line) needed for decision on sheltering and relocation.
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border agreements between the neighbouring countries possibly
impacted and how to coordinate transboundary messages.
3.1.2 WP1 scenario-based discussions: stage 2
In this second phase of discussions, the estimated time to
releasewas12 hours and the release datewasknown to be 12/07/
2017 at 15:00UTC (Fig. 9). The objective was to review the
decisions made during stage 1 for sheltering and evacuation
(Fig. 10). Additionally, food restrictions were considered
(Fig. 11).
No uncertainties remained on the release time. The
meteorological uncertainty was still represented by the 10
meteorological members.
This led to a very different prognosis frequency map of
threshold exceedance, where the plume footprint was clearly
north–northeast of the release location (Fig. 12).
Within stage 2, the questions in relation to evacuation and
sheltering were addressed (see Fig. 10), whilst taking into
account decisions made previously.
The focus on food restriction was driven by the following
questions given in Figure 11.
3.1.2.1 Feedback from WP1 stage 2 discussion
Review of evacuation and sheltering decisions
When considering the updated information, most groups
decided to extend the evacuation on a north-eastern sector
based on the frequency map (Fig. 12). They discussed the issue
of people trapped between the plume and the coast.
Several groups decided to instruct sheltering across a 50-
km zone. Some pointed out that, even if there was a more
certain wind direction, the uncertainty (coming from
meteorology) shown in the map was still high enough to
have an impact on the decision making process.
They discussed the methods of implementing sheltering,
with recommendations such as collecting children from
schools, provision of access to bottled water and food (not
freshly harvested). The conditions for lifting sheltering orderwere also discussed. For instance, issues about how long
people could stay indoors and what should be allowed or not
after lifting the order to shelter, were raised.
Food restrictions
During the short time devoted to discussing food
restriction, most groups decided to tell people not to eat
freshly harvested food in sheltering zones. They also decided
that recommendations to feed cattle on stored food and to
shelter them should also be issued in sheltering areas. In the
evacuation zone, issues about milking cows were raised. In the
background materials, some maps featured probable threshold
exceedance of food contamination within areas where no
shelteringwas planned (not shown in this article), which raised
a communication issue relating to the formulation of a food ban
message without implementing other protective actions.
3.2 Reduction of uncertainty in dose assessment
for improving situation awareness and risk estimation
(WP2)
The demonstration of tools developed in WP2 focused on
health risk assessment and its implications for decision making
in the early phase, data assimilation and monitoring strategy
and results. All three aspects will be described in the three
following subsections.
3.2.1 Health risk assessment in the early phase
The benefit of having a software tool for quick and easy
assessment of radiation attributed cancer risk for the general
population in the transition phase, based on measured doses
can be seen as widely accepted (Walsh et al., 2019, 2020).
Therefore, the demonstration focused on the applicability of
the same tool for health risk information in the early or threat
phase, when doses to population groups are based on
prognostic data only, with potentially high uncertainties. For
this, the uncertainty in the dose maps for the given scenario
was visualized by areas of countermeasures (exceedance of
Fig. 15. Updated combination of model results and monitoring data; additional information from mobile monitoring needed for decision on
sheltering in urban hot spot region.
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effective dose. The percentiles chosen were 10% (largest
areas of countermeasures), 50% and 90% (no area of
countermeasures). For the three different maps, the number
of expected cancer cases, baseline cases and the lifetime
fractional risk (Walsh et al., 2019) was then calculated, with
uncertainty, taking into account the expected dose reduction
by the respective countermeasure. This was done for a few
cancer outcomes and three age groups of the general
population, in order to limit the amount of information to be
displayed and considered. Full details will be given
elsewhere (Woda et al., in prep.).
Following thedemonstration, theparticipantsof theworkshop
were asked to discuss in groups the issue of the countermeasures
based on dose and health risk information, focussing on, amongst
other questions, whether or not they find the health risk
information to be useful and if they would recommend decision
makers to consider the health risk implications.
3.2.2 Data assimilation
With first monitoring data available, data assimilation can
be performed to contribute to better characterisation of the
situation and to better support decision making. Especially in
the early phase, data from atmospheric dispersion calculations
and data from the first and typically sparse radiological
measurements can be combined using data assimilation
techniques. The data assimilation model used in this work
is based on an Ensemble Kalman filter (EnKF). Results of the
data assimilation using an EnKF are illustrated in Figure 13.
Frequency maps of threshold exceedances for effective dose
greater 10mSv (top panels) and iodine in milk greater 500Bq/
kg are updated using data assimilation; the updated maps on
the right hand side of the panel. The updated maps show an
increase of frequency, i.e. probability, of threshold exceedance
in the affected areas and therefore a reduction of uncertainty in
the frequency maps.3.2.3 Monitoring data and monitoring strategy
As soon as data from stationary and mobile monitoring are
available and assessed they are used for further data
assimilation and for making more precise decisions based
on the improved assessment of the radiological situation.
Combination techniques for prognostic results and
monitoring data are needed to reduce uncertainties in decision
making process in urgent and early response phase.
The assumed monitoring data also showed local features,
which were not predicted by any of the ensemble members.
Additional mobile monitoring data are needed to reduce
uncertainties for dose assessment for different critical tasks for
protecting population in the early response phase of an
accidental release scenario:
– task 1 – Population living in regions, where assessed dose
exceeds dose intervention level for relocation. Additional
information from mobile dose rate monitoring help to
reduce uncertainties in the corresponding decision making
process;– task 2 – Population living in regions, where assessed dose
exceeds dose intervention level for sheltering. Additional
information from mobile dose rate monitoring help to
reduce uncertainties in the corresponding decision making
process (see Fig. 14);– task 3 –Population living in regions, where potential hot
spots are indicated e.g. due to wet deposition. Additional
information from mobile dose rate monitoring help to
reduce uncertainties in dose assessment (c.f. Fig. 15).The discussion on monitoring strategies focused of the
following points:
– Which monitoring strategies would you recommend?
– Will your strategy be based on prognostic or existing
observation data?– Which areas will be prioritised?
Fig. 17. Deposition map for 90Sr (Bqm2) used in the assessment.
Note: the values are reported as natural logarithm, ln(deposition).
Each cell covers an area of 1 km2 (from Brown et al., 2020).
Fig. 16. Area for demonstration of process-based modelling.
S26 T. Duranova et al.: Radioprotection 2020, 55(HS1), S17–S37Fig. 18. Soil property data and soil map showing the grid of spatial soil categorisations (C: clay; SL: sandy loam; SSL: sandy silty loam; LS:
loamy sand; O: organic) as used in the assessment (note this has been fabricated for demonstration purposes; from Brown et al., 2020). Cell size
equates to 1 km2.
Fig. 19. Predictions of 137Cs activity concentrations in milk using a
process-based soil–plant model for the different soils types; for
comparison predictions using FDMT are also given. Top: predictions
over 27 years; bottom: predictions over the first 90 d after deposition.
Note: an expanded and refined application of the Sr and Cs soil–plant
process-based models to the Borsselle scenario is presented and
discussed in Brown et al. (2020).
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Concerning the health risk assessment, there was an
unanimous feedback by the participants that this information is
generally important but there were reservations of applying
this tool in the early phase based on prognostic data only.
However, it was suggested that the health risk tool could be
very useful for communication to the public and to balance the
positive and negative effects of the respective counter-
measures. More details are given in Woda et al. (in prep.).
With regard to the monitoring strategy, workshop
participants stressed the importance of mobile versions of
the detectors and remarked that this should also include
unmanned aerial and ground vehicles (drones and robots). The
overall opinion was that the monitoring strategy and decision
should be based on prognostic data but that the observed data,
as soon as they are available, should be used to adjust the
recommendations. Monitoring data are also needed to decide if
the countermeasures can be lifted. Although measurements
should focus on the prioritized areas, monitoring outside these
areas was also recommended by the participants to confirm that
the level of contamination is truly negligible or zero.
3.3 Radioecological modelling: fit for purpose (WP3)
The outputs of WP3 were reviewed (see Beresford et al.,
2020) with the focus being on the development of process-
based soil–plant models and their application to the Borsselle
scenario.
The demonstration compared predictions of the FDMT
(Food Chain and Dose Module for Terrestrial Pathways)
module in the JRODOS decision support system to process-
based models focusing on predictions for 90Sr and 137Cs in
grass and milk. The default parameters of FDMT were used,
with the model being implemented in the ECOLEGO
platform (see Brown et al., 2019, Brown et al., 2020). The
effect of K-fertilisation on radiocaesium transfer to milk and
grass was also considered. The area of the scenario used for
this demonstration is presented in Figure 16. Figure 17
presents the deposition pattern over the study area and,
Figure 18, for demonstration purposes, a fabricated soil
distribution map with soil characteristics data. Figure 19
presents a comparison of results using a soil–plant processed-
based model for different soil types with predictions using the
default FDMT model.
3.3.1 Feedback from WP3 scenario-based discussions
The scenario-based presentations demonstrated that:
– process-based soil–plant models could be used for Cs and
Sr to identify areas of longer-term comparatively high (or
low) transfer and hence better focus remediation effort
(Fig. 19, top);– process-based models generally offer no appreciable
benefit for short-term predictions (as interception etc.
dominates and root uptake is minor).Process-based soil–plant models have some potential to
model soil based countermeasures (see Brown et al., 2020);
however, more work is required on how to implement (and test)this. Similarly, there is a general need to test, andwhere required,
improve the existing process-based soil–plant models.
A poster was presented at the dissemination meeting
describing the findings and conclusions of a workshop, “Do
process-based models have a role in human food chain
assessments?” (September 2019, Madrid) which was attended
by about 40 end-users (industry, regulators, international
bodies) and scientists, (see Beresford et al., 2020; Duranova
et al., 2020).3.4 Transition to long-term recovery, involving
stakeholders in decision-making processes (WP4)
The fourth block in the workshop was dedicated to
addressing the issues and uncertainties arising in the
management of the response, and the recovery preparedness
carried out by decision-makers, including the stakeholders,
during the transition phase. The situation in this period requires
of some specific efforts to conclude the emergency response
and establishing specific response plans to begin the recovery/
long-term rehabilitation of the affected areas, supporting the
Fig. 20. Information on the radiological and environmental situation of the affected areas by the accidental deposition of 137Cs.
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possible.
Two sessions were envisaged: the first, as a scenario-based
facilitated discussion, to demonstrate the development of
action strategies in both agricultural and urban scenarios, and
the second, to present the set of guidelines and recommen-
dations elaborated in WP4 to improve the decision making
process during the transition phase.
3.4.1 WP4 scenario-based facilitated discussion
The intervention scenario in the transition phase was based
on these main assumptions:
– the release has ceased, the control over the source has been
taken and urgent protective measures have been imple-
mented to avoid the exposure to population, including
evacuation, access restrictions and food restrictions;– the radioactive contamination has spread in the surround-
ings of the damaged nuclear power plant and transported
and dispersed through near regions, affecting both inhabited
areas and relevant agricultural and farming systems;– the contamination level range and the affected areas have
been identified;– it has to be decided how to proceed in such a situation. The
actions to be taken will be focused on mitigating the
consequences of the contamination and on preparing
recovery plans on the urban and agricultural areas and the
food-chain system affected.For the purposes of this session, one member of one
ensemble from WP1 was assumed to be the “real” deposition
pattern. Only the 137Cs contamination was considered.
The main question for discussion was: “How to plan the
establishment of optimal remediation strategies with stake-
holder involvement in the decision-making process?”, and the
focus in discussions was made on: Involvement of the
stakeholders in the decision-making process, and the decision
criteria and actions taken in the transition phase.
First, the introduction to the state of the scenario in the
transition phase was presented to the audience. Figure 23
shows the information provided to participants on the
radiological situation, including zoning maps according to
the ground contamination level of 137Cs and according to the
dose prognostic at both short (after the total deposition), and
long-term (one year after the deposition). These maps illustrate
the areas affected, the magnitude of the radiological impact and
the preventive actions to take on each one, in case no other
action is implemented. In the other way, the Figure 20, also
presents a summary of the environmental characterisation,
according to the land use zoning, in order to identify the
populated (urban) and productive areas of concern.
In summary, the scenario has some zoneswith an emergency
exposure situation, where if the total effective dose projected to
1y (TED1y) ≥100mSv, a permanent relocation is mandatory;
and if TED1y is among 20mSv and 100mSv, some type of
restriction of use would be implemented. In these zones, actions
Fig. 21. The urban area of concern.
Fig. 22. Options for recovery (strategies) in the urban area.
T. Duranova et al.: Radioprotection 2020, 55(HS1), S17–S37 S29trying to reduce the TED1y to20mSv should be planned and
implemented in order to look at the conclusion of the emergency
phase. Other zones will be under an existing exposure situation
because theTED1yis situatedamong1mSvand>20mSv.Here,
optimised strategies should be planned to recover the living
conditions as soon as possible.
For purposes of the demonstration, areas in the zone
heavily contaminated have been selected: An urban area
situated in the most populated zone and with a TED1y≈ 20
mSv and an agricultural system situated in the meadow areas
at the North of this zone, in Zuid-Holland.
For each environmental scenario, background information,
maps and graphs to deal with the consequence management
and preparedness for the recovery were presented to the
audience. Following, the urban and agricultural scenarios are
presented in detail.
Urban scenario
The urban area of concern was the municipality of
Cromstrijen, at the edge of the 20mSv.y1 zone. Figure 21
shows the location of this municipality and its main
characteristics, population, surface areas and the predominate-
ly built environment.
As consequence of the deposition of 137Cs, there are
different contaminated surfaces: roofs, walls, streets, pave-
ments, gardens as other areas of grass, playing grounds, sports
fields, interiors, and so on. The contamination average is
around 1MBqm2 for 137Cs and the doses range 20mSv y1.
A set of options for recovery strategy development were
agreed to be following as it is shown in Figure 22.
The consequences for health (projected residual doses in
Numansdorp, mean individual dose 1st year due the recovery
strategies, number of cancer incidents during 50 years
attributed to the exposure (population and workers)), costs
and waste were estimated and evaluated from the values used
in theWP4 Dutch panel1 (van Asselt et al., 2019) and using the
approaches developed in the WP4 task 4.1 (Charnock et al.,
2020). The results were shared with the audience as a starting1WP4 internal information and data provided by C. Twenhöfel,
RIVM, 2019.point of the discussions (some examples are shown in Fig. 23).
A table summarising the quantifiable consequences of clean-
up was also provided.
It was pointed out that also other factors, which are more
difficult to quantify, should be also taken into account to assess
the success of the strategies. The biggest uncertainty was
assumed to be probably in how much the consequences of the
accident in other regions will impact on this town, i.e.
disruption to supply chains, employment availability and
customer demand. Among other factors could be psychosocial
consequences, prevent anxiety, acceptance of the protective
actions and recovery strategy, perception of the risk for the
consumer, protection of export, independence population, trust
on the authorities and other.Agricultural scenario
For the agricultural scenario, the affected areas were
characterized as it is given in Figure 24.
Contamination and transfer to soils, crops and food-chain
(products), estimated using the modules of JRODOS (Raskob
et al., 2011) have been presented and discussed under the
scenario in Zuid-Holland. In this area, the contamination
ranges among 1 to 10MBqm2 for 137Cs. There are some
products with activity concentration above the maximum
permitted level (MPL) for commercialisation (i.e. ≥5000Bq
kg1 in grass;≥1000Bq kg1 in milk). The temporal evolution
of the activity concentration of 137Cs in agricultural products
Fig. 23. Information on the consequences of implementing different recovery strategies in the urban areas in terms of the temporal evolution of
the residual doses, mean annual doses (1st year) and costs of the strategies.
Fig. 24. Agricultural areas of concern.
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is given in Figure 25.
A set of recovery alternatives was selected from the
EURANOS handbooks (Nisbet et al., 2010) for discussion and
is presented in Figure 26.
The WP3 outputs on recovery actions in the soil as it is
presented in Figure 27 have been used as an input for
discussions.Additionally, to the uncertainties presented above due to
parameterisation or modelling of the alternatives of recovery
(Charnock et al., 2020), there are other uncertainties, inherent
to the decision making process, that rise when planning the
implementation of a recovery strategy. A summary of the main
uncertainties, identified from the WP4 stakeholders’ panels
(Montero et al., 2020) was presented to facilitate the
discussions in the working groups as follows from Figure 28.
Fig. 25. Temporal evolution of the activity concentration of 137Cs in agricultural products: Zoning according to the MPLs [Bq kg1].
Fig. 26. Recovery alternatives in the agricultural area of concern.
Fig. 27. Recovery actions in soil.
Fig. 28. Uncertainties raised in the planning of the recovery strategies
in an agricultural environment.
T. Duranova et al.: Radioprotection 2020, 55(HS1), S17–S37 S31
Fig. 29. Recommendations for each category of uncertainties.
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For better organisation of the discussions, individual groups
of10 people, arounda table,weredistributed into twoparts.Each
onewasdevoted to discuss the issues of one of the two scenarios.
The discussions on both scenarios have been driven by a
common questionnaire distributed to each group of participants
which was split into the following topical questions:
– Q1.Which are the main concerns when facing the recovery
strategy?– Q2. What are the objectives to pursue in the recovery
strategy?– Q3. What are the main factors and key criteria for the
strategy selection?– Q4. What are the main uncertainties affecting the decision
about the recovery strategy?– Q5. Choose the strategy you think it is best according to the
previous discussions.Each question included suggested answers and provided a
possibility to complete other suggestions discussed within the
working group. Participants indicated the preferences of the
main concerns when facing the recovery strategy so it was
possible to estimate the most frequent concern. The question-
naire provided the possibility to scale relative importance of
the proposed objectives to pursue in the recovery strategy,
main factors and key criteria for the strategy selection withinthe scale from 1– not important to 7– very important. The main
uncertainties have been identified within the categories such as
governance, environment, human health and safety, social,
economy and transversal issues. Based on the discussions
some working groups agreed on the strategy they thought is the
best.
The questionnaires have been collected and answers from
each working group evaluated and provided as an input for the
further discussion and demonstration of theWP6 outputs (Sect.
3.6). Positive feedback was obtained from the participants who
highlighted the usefulness of using scenario-based analysis to
engage different stakeholders in the post-accidental decision-
making process and to promote discussions where all actors
can give their views and preferences on the recovery
alternatives. Participants also highlighted the necessity of to
provide accurate and understandable information, prepared
and focussed to the objectives of the decisions, in order to have
a better knowledge on the actual reality and the possible futures
helping the decision-making on the recovery actions.3.4.2 Guidelines and recommendations for decision
making during the transition phase
The presentations and follow-up scenario-based facilitated
discussions in the area of the development of countermeasure
strategies involving stakeholders were completed with a poster
session focusing on the involvement of stakeholders in
Fig. 30. Example of societal uncertainties regarding the timing of
stable iodine intake.
Fig. 31. Example of uncertainties related to food consumption.
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have presented and discussed the objectives, materials and
methods, results and conclusions of the stakeholder engage-
ment through scenario-based discussion panels in Belgium,
France, Greece, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Slovak Republic and Spain.
Based on the cross-country comparison of the findings and
conclusions of the national panels the recommendation
associated with different category of uncertainties (gover-
nance, environment, human health and safety, social, economy
and transversal issues) have been presented as it is given in
Figure 29 and discussed in the working groups under the
category of uncertainty.
Each recommendation has been thoroughly discussed
within the working group with the focus on why this
recommendation is suggested and the way how it could be
fulfilled with the indication of the different stakeholders who
can contribute to its fulfilment.
3.4.2.1 Key feedback from WP4 discussion on guidelines
and recommendations
The next questions were proposed to participants’ groups
to facilitate the discussions:
– Do you agree with this recommendation?
– Is there anything missing?
– What should be improved or better explained?The participants expressed their views and suggestions to
improve this first set of recommendations. Working groups’
leaders collected these comments, which have been considered
to finalize the recommendations presented in more details
in Durand et al. (2020).3.5 Social, ethical and communicational aspects of
uncertainty management (WP5)
CONFIDENCE work package 5 addressed social uncer-
tainties faced by stakeholders including wider publics. The
objectives were to identify societal uncertainties in emergen-
cy and post-accident situations, highlight the ethical
implications of uncertainty management, investigate citizens’and emergency actors’ sense-making of uncertainties, and
subsequent decisions, develop improved communication of
uncertainties and provide advice for improving emergency
preparedness, response and recovery. The WP5 scenario-
based facilitated discussion focused on two key communica-
tion challenges, one in the early phase, the other in the
transition phase:
– communicating about the intake of iodine tablets;
– communicating about food safety.Participants to the dissemination workshop were divided in
groups, each group addressing one of these two topics.
Participants were also referred to the communication
recommendations formulated within CONFIDENCE WP5
(Perko et al., 2020).
For iodine tables, social uncertainties mentioned in the task
introduction included lack of knowledge about the correct use
(example given in Fig. 30) and the protective role of iodine
tablets among the residents living close to nuclear installations,
potential non-compliance with official advice, people not
having iodine tablets at home, and people not being informed
about what to do in case of accident (Turcanu et al., 2020).
The task was formulated as follows:
– Borssele scenario; 21:00, possible release within 12 hours.
Population: 300,000;– What are the most important things to communicate?
– How to do that using a text message (SMS*) for people
currently located in the potential area for stable iodine
intake?The exercise proved complex but was appreciated by the
participants as an opportunity to reflect on social and ethical
issues, as well as practical challenges in preparing for stable
iodine intake. Groups pointed out that communication would
differ according to the existing level of iodine tablet
distribution, and that there would be particular challenges
with how to distribute the stable iodine tablets in an effective
way for those who do not have tablets (e.g. tourists in the area,
queues at pharmacies). Potential problems with different
intervention levels between Belgium and the Netherlands were
noted, and authorities would need to be prepared for reactions
on social media and potential rumours. The technical
challenges of sending SMS messages (number of characters,
how to distribute, who is likely to be excluded) were discussed
as well as how the time and day would impact on the message
(Sunday evening or Monday morning), draft texts from all
groups identified the need to provide links to credible sources.
For the task related to food safety, the social uncertainties
introduced at the onset of the task included the potential
reluctance to consume products with residual radioactivity, the
Fig. 32. Weights of criteria and strategies order visualisation.
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for stigmatisation of affected areas, the support needed by local
actors (example is given in Fig. 31).
The task for participants working in this group was
formulated as follows:
– “All milk from the Zeeland area on the market is below
MPL’s”;– How would you communicate this to the public to avoid a
boycott in the Netherlands and abroad?* Identify challenges.
* What are the most important messages to convey?
* How would you communicate this?Participants recognised again the complexity of this task.
Explaining that milk containing radioactivity is below MPL’s
is challenging, particularly since the word “contaminated” has
a negative connotation. The exact message would depend on
whether some milk in the Zeeland region, or neighbouring
regions, were above MPLs, or whether all milk in Zeeland was
below MPLs. The question was raised as to what constitutes a
“safe” level of radioactivity in milk. Participants agreed that
communicating that a product is safe for consumption is
essential, but could not agree whether the milk discussed in this
scenario is safe or not (i.e., whether or not milk in Zeeland
would actually be below MPLs). Information on monitoring
strategies would be likely to play an important role in
consumer trust as well as who was giving the message.
Concerns were also raised regarding breastfeeding for babies.
3.5.1 Feedback from WP5 scenario-based discussions
Key feedback from both discussions was that this type of
communication is complex and challenging, and that
preparation before an incident is essential.
3.6 Decision making under uncertainties (WP6)
The task of MCDA scenario-based facilitated discussion
focused on the urban decontamination of the municipality
Cromstrijen/Numansdorp based on the outputs of WP4
scenario-based discussions using the method of the facilitatedscenario-based discussion in combination with the MCDA
tool.
Five different countermeasure strategies have been
discussed:
– no actions, only monitoring;
– low waste strategy;
– high waste strategy;
– low wasteþ relocation;
– high wasteþ relocation.The strategy developments itself as well as main concerns
when facing the recovery strategy, objectives to pursue in the
recovery strategy, main factors and key criteria for the strategy
selection and main uncertainties affecting the decision about
recovery strategy have been discussed by all participants in
groups within the previous work of WP4. Each group filled the
questionnaire. The results were collected and analysed for the
purpose of the MCDA scenario-based facilitated discussion.
The summary of conclusions of the outputs of the
WP4 scenario-based discussions has been presented to all
participants before the MCDA scenario-based facilitated
discussion.
It was agreed, that main concerns are:
– social impacts;
– health impacts;
– feasibility;
– environmentalþ economical and other issues.The main objectives of the recovery plan are:
– minimise the impact on the population;
– minimise the radiological impact;
– improve the public confidence.The discussions have started with following inputs:
- Goal: minimise impact in the population;
- Key criteria/attributes:* social impacts: community involvement and commu-
nity acceptance,
Fig. 33. Stability analysis for weight of criterion “Amount of waste”.
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avoidance of doses,* feasibility: duration and workforce,
* environmental: waste production and waste disposal,
* economic: employment  human capital.- Uncertainties:* What to do with wastes?!waste production!waste
amount  (H),* How to engage the community?!community involve-
ment!willingness of population to cooperate on
strategy implementation  (S),* duration of the countermeasures implementation!
dependent on workforce!number of workers needed
 (H),* data concerning the number of cancers!avoid doses
!doses  (H),* roles and decisions: local versus regional and national
authorities!community involvement!Willingness of
population tocooperateonstrategy implementation (S).A selected group of 4 stakeholders who played a role of
decision makers have acted as Crisis Centre at a stage and were
observed and supported by the remaining participants of the
workshop.
Discussion among the remaining participants in small
groups was encouraged. The crisis manager with the role
“mayor” called in additional advisors to support her in the
official discussion, thus forming a second group and providing
in one voice their decisions. The discussions were facilitated
by experienced independent facilitators. The MCDA tool was
overhead presented during the ongoing discussion. The criteria
weights and values were displayed during the discussion while
the resulting ranking of strategies was initially hidden.
The values for the “hard” (H) criteria such as waste amount,
number of workers needed and doses have been taken directly
from the JRODOS calculation results. The values for the “soft”
(S) criterion as “Willingness of population to cooperate on
strategy implementation”were estimated andagreedby the team
of decision makers with support from other participants.The thorough discussion in all groups took place during the
estimation and agreement on the weights of the criteria. At that
stage of discussion, facilitators helped to interactively observe
and evaluate the changes in criteria or weights using the
MCDA tool. The different opinions on the weights were
investigated in the MCDA tool and then consolidated into one
common agreement.
Having agreedon the initialweights forparticular criteria they
have been assessed to those using the MCDA tool. The resulting
orderof the strategieswasuncoveredanddisplayed toparticipants
after the first iteration using the bar type of visualisation as it is
presented in the Figure 32. Each criterion contributed with its
weight to the final ranking of recovery strategies.
The stability of current ranking was discussed using the
visualisation in the MCDA tool.
An analysis tool of the MCDA provided a chart which
graphically displayed what would happen if a specific weight
of a criterion was to be changed, respectively if it could not be
determined accurately (Fig. 33). Crossing lines indicate a
change in ranking, while no crossings within a wide range of
the weight indicate stability even against uncertainty. This was
understood and valued by the decision makers. From this, they
also concluded that ranking positions with close values should
not be considered absolute but treated as equally possible.
3.6.1 Feedback from WP6 scenario-based discussions
The MCDA tool was evaluated to be very helpful for
decision makers as it helps a clear structuring of the important
facts influencing the choice of an appropriate strategy.
Additionally, it triggered interesting discussions on criteria
meanings e.g. what “protect the health of the public” actually
meant under these conditions, which helped the groups to
better understand each other’s motivation. It was definitely
recognized by participants that the tool has the supportive
character and the results could not be directly taken without
deeper understanding and analysis of the actual outcome.
Political decisions as one of the factors influencing the decision
was pointed out and experienced in the discussion transpar-
ently. It was also pointed out whether criteria should be
independent from each other or not, as in real life many
decision criteria are linked e.g. by costs. Therefore it is very
difficult to determine independent criteria for decision making.
This stressed even more the need for awareness that the
advised best strategy should not be executed blindly but
regarded in respect to the determining criteria with their
dependencies and uncertainties.3.7 Round table discussions
The round table and panel discussions formed a valuable
part of the CONFIDENCE dissemination workshop and
focused on:
– achievements and way forward based on the research
results and outputs of each CONFIDENCE work package;– feedback from end users, represented by participants from
IAEA, SURO (Czech Republic), PHE (UK), STUK
(Finland) and APA (Portugal), on outputs and remaining
research requirements or improvements inmodels/guidance;
S36 T. Duranova et al.: Radioprotection 2020, 55(HS1), S17–S37– Strategic Research Agendas and CONCERT Joint Road
MapinviewofCONFIDENCEresultspresentedbymembers
of the NERIS, ALLIANCE, EURADOS and SHARE
research platforms and the CONCERT EJP coordinator;– further development and conclusions presented by
CONFIDENCE project coordinator, IAEA and ICRP
(Committee 4) representatives and the CONCERT EJP
coordinator.The key feedback is discussed in Raskob et al. (2020).
4 Conclusions
The CONFIDENCE dissemination workshop was interac-
tive and dynamic. It provided a floor for education activities in
a form of presentations and poster sessions, training using the
scenario-based activities and table-top exercises in a form of
scenario-based facilitated discussions. The wide dissemination
of results was done in an understandable way connected
directly to demonstration and practical use. Thorough
presentations were backed up by posters with more details
and a poster session giving possibilities for attendees to discuss
the poster/CONFIDENCE with the authors. Scenario-based
facilitated discussions provided the opportunity for round table
group working so that all participants were actively involved
and expressed their views, experiences, were able to raise
questions and receive answers. Round table discussions as well
as panel discussions enable feedback from participants. The
sharing of knowledge and experiences among generations of
scientists, researchers and experts took place in a very open
and effective way creating connections for future research and
development in the area of modelling and decision making in
nuclear emergencies.
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